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Understanding "Dance Understanding" 
Curtis Carter 
The history of dance offers us two opposing traditions with respect to the cognitive standing 
of dance with respect to its contribution to understanding. One view expressed by two 
characters in Lucian's Peri Orcheosis is not very complimentary. In Lucian's treatise, Crato 
ridicules his friend Lycinus for watching a "girlish fellow play the wanton with dainty clothing 
and bawdy songs". Another character, Demetrius the Cynic, dismisses dance as a mere adjunct 
to music and silk vestments consisting of meaningless, idle movements.1 A less extreme, 
though equally damaging view, is implicit in Hegel's decision to omit dance from the canon 
of major art forms in his philosophy of art. 
The opposite tradition finds endorsement in Claude Fran<,:ois Menestrier's Seventeenth 
century treatise on dance, Ballets in elassicalAntiquity and in Modern Times. Menestrier, a French 
philosopher and choreographer, argued that ballet reflects more in the way of understanding 
than its sister arts of music, painting, and poetry. Any advance in the cognitive status of dance 
found in Menestrier's claim depends on whether the understanding provided by ballet translates 
into a significant contribution to knowledge, as well as on the cognitive standing given to these 
other arts. Both of these issues will become clearer later on as the views of Hegel and 
Menestrier are subjected to further scrutiny. 
Among contemporary philosophers who have shown an interest in dance, Nelson 
Goodman and Francis Sparshott both recognize the contributions of dance to human 
understanding. Goodman includes dance, along with languages and the other fine arts, as 
important symbol systems, and Sparshott has argued that dance is one of the central 
expressions of human culture. 
Let us examine the views of these philosophers as a basis for developing some further 
thoughts on the subject. I take as a given that dance is a form of cultural activity capable of 
organizing human experience into knowledge and that a distinction must be made between 
two types of knowledge, Erlebnis and Erkenntnis. Erlebnis is knowledge arising through inner 
lived experience of the dance, while Erkenntnisis knowledge of dance acquired from description 
and interpretation of it as in the responses of audiences, and the work of critics and aesthetic 
theorists and dance historians. I will argue that dance has made noteworthy contributions to 
cognitive understanding, and will discuss some of the problems that have hindered 
1 Lucian, "The Dance", Dance Index I (1942), 105, 106. 
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appreciation of its cognitive role. 1 will focus the discussion on dance as a theatrical 
presentation. 
Like all forms of dance, theatrical dance is rooted in the human body as the center of the 
dance experience; culturally specific practices define the unique modes of its various 
embodiments. Thus, theater dance takes a wide variety of forms including ballets based on 
choreographed systems of movement enhanced with music, costumes, and stage sets, as well 
as contemporary improvisational dance. The latter substitutes open form for preset movement 
structures, and replaces the proscenium stage with non-traditional performing spaces. 
Theater dance serves a variety of purposes ranging from entertainment to explorations 
through movement of experimental aesthetic concerns and social issues. Typically, theater 
dance entails a physical as well as a conceptual separation of performers from audience, 
although the line between performer and audience is sometimes blurred. By the physical 
separation 1 refer to dancers moving on a stage or in another performing space, with the 
audience seated in a separate space while observing the performance. The dancers articulate 
works for the audience in accordance with the conventions established in the choreography 
and in the environment of theatrical costumes, sets, sound and lighting, and other stage props. 
There is an implicit contract between performers and audience which presumes certain 
common knowledge of the cultural conventions on which an understanding of dance is based 
and which allows for communication of the meaning. 
This is not to say that there are not grounds for questioning the significance of dance in 
the larger scheme of human symbolism. For example, the skepticism expressed by Lucian's 
characters conveys a view of dance that is srill shared by some members of the intellectual 
community and by segments of the general public. Dance writers of the late 20th century, who 
emphasized physical movement over style, dance history, and aesthetics also contributed to 
this sort of skepticism. Even so able a critic as Marcia Siegel wrote in 1970: ''Dance is a physical 
art, and 1 think the over-intellectualized kind of writingwhexe the writer detaches himself from 
all sensory ... and emotional connotations is just about worthless.,,2 Similar anti-intellectual 
views of dance were expressed by Marrin Gottfried, another critic. Writing about the same 
time as Siegel, he stated, "1 think the whole idea of research is very sterilizing and very 
antagonistic to life. 1 think the theater exists only in life, living people on stage". 3 While one 
agrees that critics should focus on the dance itself, it is easy to conclude from such remarks 
that dance has no relevance to the intellectual life. Also contributing to dance's precarious 
intellectual standing has been the tendency of practitioners, including performers and dance 
2 Marcia Siegel, "Two Views of Dance, Arts in Society VTII (1971), 673. 
3 Martin Gottfried, ''Journalistic Resources," Proceedings of the Second Cotiference on fusearch in Dance 
(Warrenton, Virginia, 1969), 81, 85. 
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educators, to focus selectively on the physical and emotive aspects of dance while neglecting 
cognitive-intellectual features, or failing to explore and explain the body's role in understanding. 
There are perhaps other reasons to question the contribution of dance to thought. Some 
have questioned dance's independent identity, an issue raised in Lucian's treatise where it is 
linked with bawdy songs and wanton. That dance has never been the culturally central form 
of expression in any major civilization, as was architecture in ancient Egypt or sculpture in 
classical Greece, or painting in Renaissance Italy, has also raised doubts about its significance 
for human understanding. Only at the local or tribal level has dance participated significantly 
in the self-definition of a community, or perhaps for a brief moment at the European court 
of a French king in the 17th century. This consideration, among others, led Hegelto omit dance 
from his pantheon of the major fine arts. Similarly, there have been no major spokes-persons 
for dance in the culture comparable to Michelangelo, Leonardo, Shakespeare, or Bach, at least 
not ones who have entered into public consciousness outside the small circle of dance. 
Concurrently, there is a lively philosophical tradition that recognizes and seeks to account 
for the role of dance as a mode oflearning and of transmitting knowledge. Francis Sparshott, 
in his book, Off the Ground, argues that dance is a culturally central entity because it is a mode 
of self-knowledge, a means of a community's self-definition, and because it is a manifestation 
of mind. 4 Without limiting our inquiry, it will be useful to keep these criteria in mind. Further, 
it will be useful to consider what forms the knowledge discovered through dance might take 
and what issues and questions might benefit from the insights provided by dance. Would this 
knowledge be reflective and articulate as verbal language is? Should we look to dance for aid 
in the understanding of human communication? Will the benefits of dance knowledge be 
available universally to the public, or are they limited to knowledgeable members of the 
community of dancers, artists, and scholars? If we find that dance is a great popular educator, 
might that alter how dance is practiced or its status as an art? For instance, would the greater 
extension of dance into non-artistic dimensions of life lessen its artistic development or its 
overall cultural impact? 
Menestrier: Ballet is entertainment for the mind, the ear, and the rye 
Menestrier, himself a ballet master and choreographer as well as a Jesuit philosopher writing 
on the fine arts, asserts in his treatise on dance that, despite many centuries devoted to our 
understanding through the arts, dance (ballet) has been badly neglected by philosophers. He 
builds upon philosophical writers from Plato and Aristotle up to those of his own time, as 
well as his extensive personal knowledge of the repertoire of existing ballets and his 
experiences as a choreographer, to explain the purposes of the ballet. Menestrier provides 
4 Francis Spa!shott, Off the Ground (princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988),44. 
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a normative structure, consisting of rules for maklng ballets and, to facilitate its conceptual 
purposes, a type of symbol scheme. The so-called rules apply to five essential elements of 
a ballet: invention, the form or way in which the choreographer structures the ballet; characters; 
movements; decoration, consisting of costumes and sets; and harmony which is the result of 
all parts of the ballet working together.5 His scheme is of interest not so much for its normative 
function in defining dance (ballet) but for his efforts to construct a conceptual framework to 
enable dance (ballet) to function alongside alternative symbolic frameworks. His treatise 
attempts to show how dance contributes to human understanding. 
Ballet, according to Menestrier, is an imitative art that interprets the passions and internal 
feelings, together with the external actions of man, through bodily movements (Sect. 41, 43). 
In this view, ballet is a metaphorical action that reveals the nature of things, including states 
of the soul. This, he argues, cannot be sensibly perceived except though movements. Ballet, 
according to Menestrier, thus seeks to reach the mind and imagination, and is not thus confined 
to the merely sensory. Rather, ballet seeks to engage the whole person, including the mind, 
the ear, and the eye by linking movements to a story or idea augmented by music, costumes, 
and theater design. It requires more discipline than abstract dancing, or dancing for the sake 
of dancing, which involves simply moving the body from place to place according to certain 
rhythms. 
How does Menestrier's theory advance the place of dance as a form of human 
understanding? First, it is useful to look at his views in context. In philosophical terms, his 
is a neo-Aristotelian view of the world in which representational symbols provide access to 
the essence of persons and other elements of the external world. Also implicit in his views 
is a particular stage in the development of theater dance. Still, his attempt to locate dance in 
the main conceptual framework of his time represents a serious effort to address the question 
of dance as a primary form of understanding. It recognizes dance as a serious intellectual 
enterprise and compares it favorably to other cultural enterprises including painting and music, 
as well as to philosophy. It righdy cites movement of the human body as the principal element 
in dance and attempts to link dance movement or action to the solution of key intellectual 
problems, namely how we can know the workings of the inner life and their relation to external 
actions. Of course, Menestrier's proposals reflect their period, but it is not necessary to 
subscribe to all that Menestrier's world view assumes, or to defend his claims for dance, to 
recognize his views as an important historical precedent for our undertaking. His theory is 
one of many possible schemes for analyzing a ballet, or other dance. Many alternative schemes 
have since been put forward, and many of them radically depart from Menestrier's conceptions. 
But the evolution of new models does not in itself diminish the importance of his efforts to 
5 Claude Frans:ois Menestrier, S.]., Des bal/ets anciens et modernes selon les regles du theatre (paris, 1682). 
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establish for dance a conceptual framework where it might be examined along with other 
conceptual schemes with respect to its contributions to human understanding. 
Hegel and the Dance 
Hegel's writings on dance in the early 19th century occur within the context of his own 
philosophical system, and mainly appear in his Lectures onAesthetics, which provides a definitive 
context for his treatment of the fine arts. Like Plato and Menestrier before him, he represents 
the arts as forms of reflective activity. According to Hegel, the arts are one of the types of 
human activities, together with religion and philosophy, required for full self-realization. The 
arts are a product of Spirit, and are part of human efforts to actualize freedom and learn about 
the kinds of creatures we are. On a metaphysicalleve~ they create a link between cosmic Spirit, 
human subjective creativity, and the material world. On another leve~ art works articulate 
community values and give meaning to the temporal events of history. Hence for Hege~ as 
for Menestrier, it is not a question of whether dance can be regarded as a form of cultural 
understanding, but rather how does it compare to other such forms. In ranking poetry, a verbal 
art, as the highest art form, in his scheme of artistic symbols, Hegel creates a fundamental 
problem and aims a potentially fatal blow at the claim that dance contributes to human 
understanding in any notable way. He takes the view, which has prevailed throughout 
intellectual history, that ''human action cannot in general be understood without the speech 
that articulates its intent". 6 His reasons for elevating poetry above the other arts are grounded 
in a belief that language is a superior medium for self-understanding and for articulating the 
mind itself. 
Unfortunately, with Hegel dance loses the elevated status that it was accorded in 
Menestrier's scheme. His failure to include dance among the major categories of arts -
architecture, sculpture, painting, music, and poetry - effectively leaves dance as among the 
least of the fine arts along with the lesser arts such as landscape architecture. Hegel's ranking 
of dance has undoubtedly contributed to its neglect and raised doubt about its contributions 
to human understanding. Why is dance positioned so low in Hegel's scheme? Is it because 
Hegel sees other arts as important to human understanding and fails to see how dance is? He 
certainly believed that the fine arts, together with religion and philosophy, are meant to serve 
human self-understanding as well as understanding of the world. Hegel apparently considered 
dance too closely bound to the body, and thus to the sensuous material world, to be effective 
for communicating rational self-understanding. He found dance insufficiently disengaged from 
unconscious natural bodily processes to function as a stable form of hum an symbolism. While 
6 Sparshott, Off the Ground. 34,40. 
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dance could express life in its immediacy, it lacked the necessary stability to express human 
understanding sufficient for a major place in his ranking of the arts. 
Given that Hegel ranks the arts according to their suitability for expressing reflective 
spiritual content, this suggestion cannot be dismissed. Indeed, Hegel lived in a world where 
reason was the main element for validating an action. This was a world very different from 
the anti-rationalist intellectual environment oflate 20th century's postmodern thought, where 
emotions and bodily actions often challenge reason as the main components of human 
experience. For Hegel these elements were present in human experience but subordinate to 
reason. 
Perhaps Hegel saw the range and importance of what was portrayed through dance as too 
limited. Given that his writings on the arts are based on a merger of observed practices in 
history and his own philosophical concepts, it would have been difficult for Hegel to give 
dance a prominent role without convincing examples on which to draw. The types of dance 
that were available for viewing apparently emphasized spectacle and technique and often gave 
prominence to the dancers' personalities over substantive ideas. Hegel himself remarked on 
the vacuous state of dance in which pantomime is lost in meaningless technical skill.7 His view 
is succinctly expressed in these words: ''We do not dance in order to think about what we are 
doing; interest is restricted to the dance and the tasteful charming solemnity of its beautiful 
movement."s 
The ballet of his time after the Ballet d'action of]. G. Noverre did not develop its promised 
reforms of formalistic dancing, Salvatore Vigano's choreodramas, and similar work of other 
choreographers did not assure Hegel of the viability of dance as an important art form.9 He 
would have missed the emergence of romantic ballet after the 1830s. (Hegel wrote his 
aesthetics during the 1820s.) Fundamentally, Hegel found the dance available to him dance 
lacking in spiritual expression and bordering on intellectual poverty. Thus, dance for ·Hegel 
lacked the symbolic power to make sense of human lives or their communities and failed to 
express or address the highestlevels of the human mind. It falls short of Hegel's requirement 
that art must advance the self-civilizing processes of human culture. 
Twentieth Century Views 
Doubts about the intellectual contributions of dance persisted in the academy, if not in society 
at large, well into the second half of the 20th century and beyond. Yet there are signs that dance 
is being taken more seriously. For example, interest in western theater dance soared during 
7 G.W.F. Hegel, Aesthetics, translation of Hegel's Asthetik (1835) by T. M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1975), 1192. See also Sparshott, Off the Ground, 33-45 for further analysis of Hegel's views on dance. 
S Hegel, Aesthetics, 495. 
9 Sparshott, Off the Ground, 33. 
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the 1970s and '80s as the works of innovators within the tradition of ballet and beyond 
produced new forms of dance. Dance in the university moved from the physical education 
department to that of fine arts and scholars from many disciplines began to write about dance. 
At the same time the standards for scholarship in dance history improved to the point where 
the Society for Dance History Scholars was admitted to the American Council of Learned 
Societies in 1997. This event was followed in 1998 by the publication of the first International 
EnfYclopedia of Dance. Admission to this body of academic societies signaled a new recognition 
of the place of dance in intellectual life. One might argue that granting dance the status of 
membership in this prestigious group of scholarly societies constitutes recognition equivalent 
to its inclusion in a major classifications of the arts, thus offsetting the effects of Hegel and 
others who had not previously validated the contributions of dance to human understanding. 
Similarly, philosophers such as Nelson Goodman and Francis Sparshott have initiated a 
reassessment of the cognitive importance of dance and its place in human understanding that 
warrants attention. 
Nelson Goodman on Dance 
The American philosopher Nelson Goodman, whose Languages of Art (1967) and other essays 
on the arts provided a new program for aesthetics based on his theory of symbols, was keenly 
interested in the dance. During the 1970s, he was director of the Dance Center at Harvard. 
Later, in the 1980' s Goodman conceived and actively participated in the production of Hockry 
Seen, a dance performance made in collaboration with the American choreographer Martha 
Gray, the composer John Adams, and the visual artist Katharine Sturgis. Hockry Seen was 
performed at Harvard in 1972 and in Knokke-Ie-Zoute, Belgium in 1980.10 More important 
for our purposes, Goodman recognized dance among the major art forms and provided for 
its cognitive role in his theory of the arts. Goodman thus invites consideration of dance, 
together with the other arts, as partners with the sciences in the pursuit of understanding. 
According to Goodman, dance performances, together with pictures, musical performances, 
literary texts, films, and buildings, shape our experiences just as do verbal language and 
scientific symbols. 
Goodman's new program for aesthetics analyzes the various art forms, including dance, 
according to their symbolic features, in order to demonstrate their contributions to human 
understanding and communication. Cognitive activity, whether in the arts or the sciences, 
represents "symbol processing: inventing, applying, interpreting, transforming, and 
10 The rights and certain elements including drawings of Katharine Sturgis, masks, slides, and a film were 
given to the Haggerty Museum of Art, Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, USA from the estate 
of Nelson Goodman upon his death in 1998. 
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manipulating symbols and symbol systems".l1 Representation, expression, and exemplification 
are the main types of symbolism Goodman uses to characterize the cognitive features and 
functions of the arts. These types of symbolism are diffe.rentiated according to clusters of 
syntactic and semantic characteristics such as syntactic density, semantic density, and 
exemplification.12 For example, syntactic density, which refers to the number of symbols and 
the nature of their ordering in an entire scheme, is used to differentiate dense representational 
systems from articulate notational systems. And semantic density, which pertains to the number 
of references and the nature of their ordering in a symbol scheme, is used to differentiate 
ordinary languages from notational systems such as music. On the other hand, exemplification 
is a type of reference which runs from a sample, such as a dance movement, to the label 
denoting it, for example a feeling of sadness. Exemplification applies to expressive as well 
as abstract, non-verbal symbols. 
The main point of Goodman's analysis of dance and other symbols is to show that their 
purpose is "cognition in and for itself' driven by intellectual curiosity and aimed toward 
enlightenment. His criteria for artistic symbols subordinate aesthetic excellence to cognitive 
excellence, which means that dance and other the arts share the same standards as cognitive 
excellence in science. Symbolization in the dance then "is to be judged fundamentally by how 
well it se.rves the cognitive purpose: by the delicacy of its discriminations and the aptness of 
its allusions; by the way it works in grasping, exploring, and informing the world; by how it 
participates in the making, manipulation, retention, and transformation ofknowledge".13 Hence 
the processes that occur with respect to making a dance: creating and modifying motifs, 
elaboration of motifs, theme and variation, connecting movements with music, staging, and 
so forth are all means of achieving cognitive efficacy. Similarly the spectator's experience 
requires active engagement of the mind and is a process of exploring and discovering the rich 
and subtle cognitive relationships found in the dance. These cognitive relationships incorporate 
feelings, as Goodman holds the view that feelings operate cognitively in dance, along with 
formal patterns and other components.14 This means that the dance is apprehended th.rough 
the feeling of a movement operating in conjunction with these other structural elements. 
Hence he rejects the dichotomy of the cognitive and the emotive in favor of a model that 
allows for the interplay of all of the different components of an experience. 
Goodman's theory of symbols thus provides a model tlu:ough which to see the possibilities 
for dance's contributions to human understanding. The pa.rticular domain of dance symbols 
11 Nelson Goodman, Problems andPrqjetts (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1972), 110. 
12 Goodman, Problems andPrqjects, 111. Goodman also uses these concepts to distinguish aesthetic from 
non-aesthetic symbols. 
13 Goodman, Problems and Prqjects, 115. 
14 Goodman, Problems and Projects, 107. 
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is movement of the human body. Typically the movements are orchestrated within the 
parameters of a system of movement provided by a tradition such as classical ballet or one 
of the newer systems developed during the past century. Some dances use denotative symbols, 
which can be replaced by verbal instructions or descriptions of familiar activities and events. 
For instance, a Renaissance ballet that represents the movement of the planets could in theory 
be replaced bya scientist's description of planetary movement. Other dances, says Goodman, 
exemplify rhythms and dynamic shapes, which do not relate easily to the familiar. Yet these 
experiences also heighten awareness of ourselves or the world and awaken curiosity inviting 
exploration and discovery. Such symbols reorganize experience and introduce distinctions 
not previously understood. The vocabulary for understanding ourselves and our worlds evolves 
as a result of such experiences. 15 The process is most dynamically evident when one is involved 
in creating a dance, or in experiencing a performance firsthand. But the discoveries of such 
moments are cumulative and connect with ongoing experiences, much in the sense thatJohn 
Dewey proposed :in his book, Art as Experience. 
Has Goodman's reconceptualization of the cognitive role of dance offset the damage done 
by Hegel? Goodman shows the common ground that exists among symbols in the arts and 
other domains by recognizing their symbolic nature and allows for differences in types of 
symbolism and their functioning in pursuing a common goal of understanding. There is no 
hierarchy among types of symbols apart from their suitability for providing greater or lesser 
distinctions and the enrichment of knowledge. In this respect, dance is more or less equal 
with respect to the other arts and non-artistic symbolism as to its potential contributions to 
understanding. Similarly, Goodman's aesthetic theory allows for differences based on pragmatic 
considerations such as functional efficacy rather than metaphysics. 
Sparshott on the Contributions ojDance to Understanding 
Francis Sparshott, in two monumental works on dance, Off the Ground (1988) andAMeasured 
Pace (1995), has attempted to provide a philosophical basis for exploring in depth the role of 
dance in human experience. Sparshott reflects upon dance as a central form of expression 
in the lives of human perpetrators of culture. This is another way of phrasing the question 
of dance's contributions to human understanding. Although Sparshott's analysis covers many 
aspects of dance, the focus here will be on the art of theater dance. According to Sparshott, 
the core requirements for an art such as dance consist of practitioners, an interested public, 
and organizations that maintain, transmit, and promote the art.16 His focus is upon dance as 
15 Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1968), 64. 
16 Sparshott, Off the Ground, 11 O. 
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a type of organization of knowledge and skills grounded in a cultural practice, rather than as 
a particular kind of symbolism. 
There are two main elements in Sparshott's approach: dance as a practice and dance as a 
means of transformation of the person dancing. Fitst, dance exists as a practice when persons 
knowingly engage in bodily movements with a recognizable form that can be identified by 
conventions such as values expressed in rules, standards, or ideals. That is, dance as a practice 
entails the following: that someone is dancing, that dancing allows for a theory of dancing, 
and that someone knows when she is dancing. Theory provides a "reflective identification" 
of the activity and a "structure of intention" sufficient to enable interested persons to 
knowingly participate, or to enable spectators, including theorists, to knowingly reflect casually 
or with analytic and critical intent on the activity, and to compare the activity with other cultural 
practices.17 The concept of dance practices thus provides the means for choreographers and 
dancers to engage in making dances and performing them. For our purposes dance practices 
offer a focus for considering dance's contributions to human understanding. In this context, 
theater dance will be seen as one type of symbolic activity, which varies according to cultural, 
including ethnic and stylistic, diversity. 
Sparshott argues that dance, when done for its own sake, can substantially change the 
dancer's being.18 "Transformation" refers to what happens during the course of dancing itself 
as something different from other kinds of engagement. What are the special features of this 
extraordinary dance experience? Endotelicity (precluding any ends other than the activity 
itself); an emphasis on the quality of the dancing; the appropriateness of dance movements, 
the space, and the costumes to the occasion; and the fact that dancing consists of the special 
movements of the dancer's own body as a whole.19 The latter is the most important 
consideration. Transformation is transitory, and, at the end of the dance, the dancer again 
becomes a person in the workaday world. The dance state is perhaps analogous to a state of 
religious ecstasy. Here, Sparshott argues that the deepest meanings of dance are analogous 
to the deepest kinds of self-transformation. His view is grounded in the assumption that the 
use of the body in the non-utility-based actions of dance is somehow contributory to the 
human spirit in ways that other artistic and non-artistic activities are not. In the end, Sparshott's 
idea of transformation is linked to a philosophical view concerning what it means to be human. 
The body as merely an animated mechanism is rejected in favor of the notion of "the body 
as conscious corporeality or corporeal consciousness, and the equation of the latter with being 
human". 
17 Sparshott, OJ! the Ground, 114, 115. 
18 Sparshott, OJ! the Ground, 342-344, and Francis Sparshott, A Measured Pace: Toward a Philosophical 
Understanding of the Art of Dance (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995),5 & 95-97. 
19 Sparshott, OJ! the Ground, 343. 
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Is Sparshott's concept transformation an, or even the, answer to the problem of dance and 
understanding? Intuitively one is sympathetic to Sparshott's line of reasoning, for it does 
appear that something special happens when one dances, both in the theater and outside. But 
transformation, whateverits contribution might be, affects only the dancers. Yet theater dance 
is meant to be seen and must be interpreted before meaning can be attached to it for any other 
than the choreographer and the performers. How is this experience transmitted to spectators 
and to others capable of linking the understanding of dance to knowledge in other fields? 
Sparshott is aware of the need to bridge the gap between what the dancer knows in doing 
and what the spectator knows by seeing, and devotes several pages of Off the Ground to 
surveying various options for addressing this question.20 For example, Sparshott considers 
and rejects empathy theory that provides for a sympathetic transfer of the experience 
undergone in the body of the dancer to the spectator. He objects that self-transformation "was 
not a matter of feeling, kinesthetic or other but a matter of one's construction of the world 
of one's action and of oneself in it".21 Sparshott shifts the discussion to ''what dance is" 
without revealing how the dancer's transformation passes to the spectator. From this discussion 
we learn some of the requirements for a spectator's seeing a dance: background knowledge 
sufficient to provide a system of interpretation, the means to articulate the dancer's movements 
into meaningful elements of phrases, and the ability to tell what to look at. But transformation 
for the spectator remains elusive. 
Sparshott's analysis takes us a certain way toward seeing how dance might contribute to 
human understanding and might be related to other conceptual frameworks. Yet he leaves 
us only at the threshold. The idea of transformation is only briefly sketched and that in terms 
of the dancer's experience. There is inadequate explanation of how this experience passes 
from the performer to the spectator, or of how the symbols generated through a dance 
performance would function cognitively for the spectators. For instance, how does the 
transforming experience affect ordinary life? Is it a factor in aesthetic enjoyment, or does it 
bear on fulfillment of one's moral commitments? Furthermore, Sparshott does not provide 
a sufficient account of how the experiences of the choreographers and performers differ from 
other manifestations of dance understanding as experienced by spectators, critics, and theorists. 
Nor is there sufficient account of how the experiences of the choreographers' and performers' 
experiences might differ from other manifestations of dance understanding, for spectators, 
critics, and theorists. 
20 Sparshott, Off the Ground, 354 f£ 
21 Sparshott, Off the Ground, 356. 
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Final Section 
How can we advance beyond Menestrier, Hegel, Goodman, and Sparshott?22 I begin with 
some assumptions concerning cognition as a process leacling to human understancling. First, 
cognition includes learning, knowing, gaining insight, and understanding by all available means. 
I also assume - and here I am in agreement with Goodman and others - that the range of 
human symbols holcling cognitive significance includes all of the arts. This view is shared by 
Rudolf Arnheim, Susanne Langer, and Howard Gardner, who have conducted extensive 
research on the arts and human development. Arguments in support of the view that dance 
is made up of cognitive symbols have already been considered. I shall now focus on cognition 
and the distinction between performances and responses to performances. 
Performances and responses to them, such as the audience member's immediate response, 
criticism, and aesthetic theory represent important modes of dance - related cognition. The 
distinction between performance and response draws attention to two different aspects of 
knowledge as reflected in the German words, Erlebnis and Erkenntnis. Erlebnis, which is 
sometimes referred to as knowledge l?Y acquaintance, is knowledge attained through inner lived 
experiences of dancers in the process of performing and also the inner lived experiences of 
first hand observers in direct contact with the performance.23 It is an ordered, intelligible 
symbolic process through which the agent or producer undergoes the experience of 
performing, sends out information to the audience, and is also the receiver of information 
concerning the process itself and the meaning of its symbols. Erkenntnis is knowledge about 
something and consists of description and interpretation. Ids "outer world" knowledge based 
on observation and reasoning processes such as association, comparison, appeals to prior 
knowledge, and judgment. Knowledge in the form of Erkenntnis may, under some 
circumstances, serve as a "mental" substitute for the object or event. The difference between 
Erlebnis and Erkenntnis is further clarified by Gilbert Ryle's distinction between knowing how 
and knowing that in the sense that Erlebnis involves a practical knowledge of how to dance, or 
how to see it from a first perspective based on the viewer's own lived experiences of how it 
feels to dance, as opposed to "outer" knowledge about the dance based on remembering, 
reflection, judging, or other forms of analytical reasoning. The difference is between practice 
and theory. It is not merely one of subjective versus objective, because the dancer's 
22 Curtis L. Carter, "Arts and Cognition: Performance, Criticism, and Aesthetics", Art Education, 36 
(1983), 61-67. 
23 I base my account of Erlebnis in part on Wilhelm Dilthey's discussion of lived experiences which 
include willing and knowing in the formation of understanding. See Wilhelm Dilthey, Seleaed Works I, 
Introduaion to the Human Sciences, edited by Rudolf Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi (princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1989). See also, Jos de Mul, The Tragedy of Finitude: Dilthry's Hermeneutics ofLije, ch. 7, 
translated by Anthony Burrett (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004). 
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performance is a form of realizing consciousness for her/himself as well as for the viewers 
who then objectify the experience in their own conscious bodies. 
It is my intent here to use these two forms of knowledge to advance the discussion. In the 
case of dance, however, description or interpretation seldom, if ever, amounts to an exhaustive 
characterization of the work. It is necessary to supplement Erkenntnis with Erlebnis, which is 
supplied by seeing, hearing, or undergoing, as in the case of performing, in the actual presence 
of the dance work. My aim is not, therefore, to propose that Erkenntnis and Erlebnis constitute 
a dualism of knowledge with respect to dance. There are in fact elements of both at work in 
a dance performance and in the responses to it. The dancer brings to the performance a 
substantial knowledge about dance (Erkenntnis) including a system of formalized training and 
the formal structure of the choreography being executed. At the same time, she/he discovers 
and reveals to the audience an individualized presence that can only be experienced at a 
particular moment of performance (Erlebnis). According to Gardner, the typical audience 
member observing dance is likely to be engaged primarily in terms of affective reactions, 
including feelings, tension, or resolution, or in terms of the ideas suggested in the work, rather 
than by the formal means. In this instance, the type of dance understanding consists primarily 
of Erlebnis.24 But this depends on the amount of knowledge that the spectator brings to the 
dance experience, which can vary gready. It is difficult to say precisely what elements affect 
the audience's involvement. Among factors to be considered are the audience's awareness that 
the dance work is projecting elements of the choreographer's ideas and that the dancer is 
projecting some aspects of his/her unique personal qualities, as well as the audience's 
understanding of the style of the performance. 
A critic responding to a performance receives his/her initial impressions in the moment 
of observing a performance, that is, as Erlebnis, but a critic goes beyond the audience to engage 
in reflection, description, and interpretation (Erkenntnis) which enables him/her to link the 
evaluation of the work to particular features of the performance. His interpretation requires 
additional study, comparison of works and performances, drawing upon a repertory of prior 
knowledge of dance, and communicating in words the results to others. 
Aesthetics refers primarily to philosophical responses to the arts and is a form of Erkenntnis. 
It provides the concepts and principles necessary for identifying dance works and determining 
their constituent properties as reflected in the works of writers cited previously in this text. 
A theory of dance thus provides the concepts and principles necessary for identifying and 
appreciating performances, as well as for the development of criticism, and for relating 
24 Howard Gru:dner, TheArts andHnman Development (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973), 323 & 324. 
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knowledge available through dance to knowledge as it exists in other cultural forms as found 
in the humanities and the sciences. 
It useful to examine more closely how Er!ebnis and Erkenntnis apply, respectively, to the 
tasks of performers, critics, and aesthetics theorists. My thoughts on performance are guided 
in part by conversations with two ballet dancers and two modem dancers who were asked 
to describe their own experiences of performing and by various theoretical studies. A dance 
performance occurs within an established system of movement with its own rules and 
conventions for creating dances. Even improvisational dance practices follow certain 
conventions within which improvisation occurs. Once the system is internalized, the performer 
is able to join with a choreographer and other dancers in its creative uses. The principal 
elements in a performance from the dancer's point of view are the movements called for in 
the choreography or invented though improvisation. The dancer then draws upon his/her 
own skills to execute the movements with the right qualities of shape, line, proportion, and 
feeling. A sense of movement style in accordance with the overall intent of the piece is also 
required. 
Among the various factors necessary to accomplish the performance, kinesthetic intelligence 
appears to exercise a dominant role. Kinesthetic intelligence is a kind of spatial intelligence 
that operates through the muscles and includes muscle memory. Psychologists refer to it as 
the sensory system which controls all bodily movement and orients the moving body in space.25 
Kinesthetic intelligence provides the dancer with an immediate awareness of the position of 
the body in space. It also registers the characteristics of movement, including rate, extent, and 
duration, in all the different parts - muscles, joints, tendons - throughout the body. 
Kinesthetic intelligence is thus a key element in enabling the dancer to learn the movements 
of a dance. Like other aspects of human intelligence, it is a flexible capacity capable of being 
directed to any number of different systems for creating dances. 
As it is with other forms of cognitive behavior, mind has a central role in the execution 
of a dance performance. But mind in this sense is really the intelligent, conscious body acting 
as the controlling force that coordinates all of the various sources that a dancer may draw upon 
to create a performance (Nietzsche and Merleau Ponty). This includes kinesthetics, feelings 
and ideas, as well as prior training, choreography, style, and the rich cultural systems that 
support the dance. Mind thus harmonizes rhythmic spatial qualities of movement with 
expressive qualities and abstract ideas to create a sense of unity and order in a performance. 
A ballet dancer has described the role of the mind in a performance with these words: "The 
25 M. G. Scott, ''Measurement of Kinesthesis", Researach Quarterfy 26 (1955), 324-341. Also G. Sage, 
Introduction to Motor Behavior. A NeurophysicalAproach (l\1enlo Park, California: Addison Wesley, 1971). 
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mind is the controlling center. It enables us to be in command of our bodies, to be 
concentrated, to bring clarity, and to acquire the right feeling that the movement needs.,,26 
The knowledge that a dancer receives through performing a dance includes having a vivid, 
individualized sense of the work from beginning to end, as well as a sense of its overall shape. 
The aim and structure of the work as provided by the choreographer are internalized and given 
shape in the mind and body of the dancer. The mind/body activity of the dancer incorporates 
abstract relations of space and time, of space and proportion, as well as concrete awareness 
of the movement phrases and body shapes and their connections in the overall performance. 
Heightened awareness of relationships between the various parts of the moving body, as well 
as among the dancers working together in a performance, results in a state of "thinking in 
movement". Following Merleau Ponty, and Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, the movement becomes 
the presence of thoughtP From this brief overview, it is apparent that dance performance 
represents an enormously complex set of cognitive operations requiring attention to several 
different domains. Erlebnis requires thatwe consider kinesthetic processes, feelings, and ideas, 
all in relation to movement. While Erlebnis appears to be the primary feature of knowledge 
considered from the point of view of the performer, a performance can also function as symbol 
for communicating ideas and feelings. Hence, through movement, a performance may present 
knowledge about something other than itself, as when the movement tells an edifying story 
or imitates the movements of the planets. In such instances, the performance approaches 
Erkenntnis, but this does not seem to be its primary function. Because the producer is also 
the receiver of the knowledge given in the performance, the dancer is in a unique position with 
respect to knowledge. As the producer, the dancer is in a position to share in the discoveries 
that unfold during the creative process; as the receiver, he/ she also aware of the outcome that 
is shared with audiences, critics, and theorists. 
While a dancer's knowledge may include what has been discovered during the creative 
process, there are apparent differences between the knowledge experienced directly by the 
producer and knowledge as it appears to the audience, and in criticism and aesthetic theory. 
The audience does not undergo the internal feedback of the performer and typically is not 
on the same level with respect to knowledge of the choreography and training. Rather the 
audience's knowledge, though firsthand experience, depends on seeing and other sensory and 
conceptual modes of information, including the kinesthetics, being transmitted and processed 
by the mind-body systems. The audience's knowledge, as well as that of critics and theorists, 
predominantly, but in varying degrees, are forms of Erkenntnis or knowledge about the 
26 Ann Marie De Angelo, principal dancer, Jeffrey Ballet, Interview, New York, November, 1980. 
27 Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, "Thinking in Movement," Journal of Aesthetics andArt Critidsm, 39:4 (1981), 
398-407. 
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performance. The audience's firsthand experience is heavily imbued with Erlebnis, but he/ she 
brings to the work beliefs and theories concerning dance and other matters of culture that are 
essentially forms of Erkenntnis. This is even more so for critics. A critic's experience of dance 
begins with direct observations, but these experiences are then merged and absorbed into a 
complex network of verbal description of the movement patterns and expressive qualities 
found in a particular dance as well as with interpretation which draws on the critic's personal 
knowledge and institutional practices. On a more abstract leve~ aesthetic theory offers a 
philosophical framework for discussing dance, while seeking to improve our thinking not so 
much about a particular performance, but about the concepts and theories that we apply to 
theater dance in general. 
From the distinctions between Erlebnis and Erkenntnis offered here, it follows that human 
potential for learning through dance encompasses these two aspects. Erlebnis recognizes 
knowledge accessible directly through participation in dancing and to directly perceivable 
knowledge that is communicated in the presence of a dance performance. Knowledge in such 
instances is transmitted through the formally ordered patterns of a system of dance movements, 
which includes kinesthetic and expressive features as well as abstract time and space 
configurations. Knowing a work in the sense of Erlebnis is akin to knowing an object through 
inner sensory and emotive experience, as opposed to knowing the object though words and 
labels that describe it or through verbal concepts and theories that interpret it. Erlebnis does 
not occur independently of Erkenntnis because a performer's or an observer's knowledge are 
normally informed by prior knowledge about dancing and its place in the culture. Similarly, 
dance criticism and aesthetic theory as forms of Erkenntnis contribute to our knowledge. 
Criticism provides a record of fact and opinion against which to gauge our own understanding 
of dance performances and lead us to explore on a deeper level our own initial reactions, thus 
expanding our knowledge. Aesthetic theory is formed in abstract verbal language and lacks 
the sensory immediacy of performance itself and direct contact with individual works. It 
provides the conceptual foundation for establishing the cognitive significance of dance. 
Each of these levels of engagement with dance: performance, audience, critic, and aesthetic 
theorist represent a level of cognitive involvement with dance. If dance is to have a greater 
role in the cognitive life, it will take place at all of these levels. For the dance producers, the 
results will be increased self-understanding of dance practices and the pedagogical aspects of 
teaching and research in the field of dance. For the public, the main vehicles for increased 
appreciation of the role of dance will be through experiencing performances and through 
reading what critics have to say. For the intellectual community of theorists and scholars, 
intensified scholarship aimed at providing intellectual frameworks that allow for 
interdisciplinary communication of the contributions available through dance will surely widen 
the understanding of dance itself and its relevance to cultural knowledge in general. 
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On-Going Challenges 
Today dance enjoys a renewed life in contemporary cultures and a rich diversity of forms, 
ranging from dances based on traditional set choreography to improvisational and culturally 
diverse dance forms. In modernity with its emphasis on the purity of art media, basically all 
of the arts aspired to communicate without verbal assistance. This was part of a struggle in 
mid-twentieth century to reinstate the communicative aspects of non-linguistics forms of 
expression. An increasing emphasis upon pure music without text, abstraction in painting, 
concrete poetry without reference, and dance that does not tell a story followed. These 
developments resulted in the emancipation of the different symbol systems including dance, 
and prepared for new discussions of symbol systems in the manner of Nelson Goodman and 
others. This development resulted in new possibilities for dance. For example, it meant that 
gestures and movements are able to communicate a meaning on their own. And the repertory 
of dance expands in post-modern art as movement combines with video and computer 
technology. 
The constant search for new paradigms in theater dance, while enriching the field, also point 
to instability in the forms. In its most extreme view, this theme is expressed in Merce 
Cunningham's words, "I started out with the idea that first of all any kind of movement could 
be dancing ... Then I went on to the idea that each dance should be different. That is, what 
you find for each dance as movement should be different from what you had used in previous 
dances".28 Another important development affecting the state of dance has to do with the 
increased focus on the material elements of the arts, which emerged with post-modernism 
in the late nineteen seventies. This trend goes against Hegel's prescription in favor of spirit 
and idea over the material in the development of art, and is a reversal of contemporary 
conceptual art where ideas or concepts dominate over the material elements in art. Thus, in 
a kind of reversal of the dialectic, the material has again come into the forefront of the arts. 
For example, developments in photography, as well as in painting, again emphasize the 
materiality of the medium. In this context, the materiality of the body, which gave problems 
to Hege~ actually becomes an advantage, which probably helps to explain why dance has 
become more popular in the late twentieth century. 
Despite notable bursts of creativity and diversity, anyone familiar with the history of dance 
and its place in education will know that dance's struggle for recognition as a form of 
knowledge has been ongoing and that its place in education remains to be established on any 
firm basis.29 The questions raised in Hegel's incisive critique concerning whether dance 
28 Merce Cunningham, The Dancer and the Dance: Merce Cunningham in concersation with Jacque/ine Lesschaeve 
(New York and London: Marion Boyars, 1985), 39. 
29 Curtis L. Carter, "The State of Dance in Education: Past and Present," Theory Into Praaice:Teaching the 
AttsXXIII: 4 (1984), 293-299. 
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measures up to verbal symbols remain open. That is, whether dance is too unstable to serve 
as a main vehicle of cultural understanding, or whether it is too closely linked to life in its 
immediacy to have lasting significance. 
Even more important, there has been no way of notating theater dance capable of 
registering it in the public consciousness; whereas, there has been a long-standing traditions 
of musical notation accessible to the public. This absence continued, at least until the 
emergence of photography in the late nineteenth century and, film and video in the twentieth 
century. Apropos of these developments is the parallel between the emergence of 
photography, film, and video and the rise of dance in the twentieth century. Without the 
supp-ort-from-tlres-e-medi~rarts-iris-un:likely-tlrardance-would-have-reccive-d-the-increas:i:o:g 
attention it has enjoyed in the late twentieth century. 
Ryle's distinction between knowing how and knowing thathelps clarifywhy dance is so difficult 
for audience members who lack practical experience of training in theatrical dancing. They 
are unable to relate what they see or know from secondary sources (outer experience) to their 
own inner lived experiences. The broader implication is that if you don't have your own lived 
experience of dance based on knowing how to dance, it is even more difficult to draw on dance 
for understanding. Dance understanding consists of a p:rocess of linking inner personal 
experiences to matters in outer experiences, including those in which other persons may 
participate. This process may involve feeling and willing as well as the organizing structures 
that evolve out of consciousness and are shared through the dance. The situation is different 
in music where there are long established traditions of people actually making music, in Roland 
Barthes words, "a muscular music" in which the body not only hears, but also actively 
transcribes what it reads by making sound and meaning.3D At least this has been true until 
recent times, when this tradition of actually play.ing has been largely replaced by the passive 
music of the concert, festival, or CD-ROM. The situation is different for poetry, where the 
poet who writes a poem about death can count on the fact that the readers typically will have 
had an experience of writing, perhaps even of writing poetry, and also of the feelings associated 
with death. 
Despite these challenges, I believe that dance has been rightfully positioned in this 
discussion as a notable contribution to human understanding. Here I have attempted to set 
forth a selection of the models past and present available for addressing the conceptual aspects 
of dance. The most effective models will include a framework for transforming the bodily-
emotive, the kinesthetic as well as the logical components of dance into cultural symbols 
capable of transmitting meaning. Moreover, they must recognize that dance is continuously 
reinventing itself, resulting in the absence of the kind of stability expected of verbal languages. 
30 Roland Barthes, Image, Music, Text, translated by Stephen Heath (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1977), 149. 
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Perhaps it is dance's greater successes in its uses of the conscious body as a form of self-
knowledge and transformation that most distinguishes dance from other vehicles of human 
understanding. The specifics of working out the details for increasing the cognitive significance 
of dance must take place in culturally specific settings and will benefit most fully from 
identification with those world-views most concerned with what it means to be human.31 
31 I would like to thank J os de Mul of the University of Erasmus in Rotterdam and Yehuda Yannay of 
the University of Wisconsin Milwaukee for their suggestions for clarifying arguments and expanding the 
discussion of certain points, and Howard Goldfinger for assistance with editing. 
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